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Discriminating Shoppers Beware 
DANA K. NELKIN* 
In The Discriminating Shopper, Michael Blake starts with two settled 
points upon which liberals seem to agree: racial discrimination is wrong 
and freedom of association is a fundamental human right.1  These points 
appear to conflict when it comes to the morality of discrimination in 
employment, and in the related case of private discrimination in 
shopping—for example, decisions to patronize only stores owned by 
whites, or men, or redheads.  These two cases coincide in instances of 
“rational discrimination,” situations in which hiring employers have no 
racist attitudes themselves (or any other attitudes that make them favor 
characteristics other than talent and motivation to do the job), but, 
knowing that their customer base prefers to be served by members of a 
certain racial group, choose to discriminate in their hiring decisions. 
Is rational discrimination ever permissible?  Blake suggests that to 
answer the question, we need to first answer the question of whether the 
customers’ preferences and related shopping behavior are legitimate in 
the first place. 
Blake begins by eliciting intuitions about two cases.  The first is taken 
from Dworkin’s discussion of the famous Regents of the University of 
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California v. Bakke case, in which he seems to recognize as legitimate 
African-Americans’ preferences for African-American doctors.2  Blake 
suggests that because Dworkin sees these preferences as legitimate, he 
concludes that being African-American counts as a talent when it comes 
to serving the community and so the medical profession ought to cater to 
its desires.  Thus, the UC Davis medical school is not violating Bakke’s 
right to be judged on talent when it accepts black students with lower 
test scores over Bakke, who is white and has higher scores. 
Blake agrees that it is permissible to cater to the preference for 
African-American doctors, but offers a second case that he claims gives 
us reason to reject Dworkin’s conclusion.3
In 1947, the Jacksonville Parks Commission voted to cancel a game in 
which Jackie Robinson would be playing as a member of the Brooklyn 
Dodgers.  In 1953 the Jacksonville Beach Chamber of Commerce voted 
to officially ban integrated baseball in the city, even though they claimed 
there was no prejudice involved on their part.  The reason given for the 
ban was simply that patrons of the local team preferred to watch an all-
white team.  In this case, Blake rejects the claim that it is permissible to 
cater to these patrons’ preferences.  And yet it would seem that this 
preference for light skin on baseball players is akin to the preference for 
dark skin on doctors; if dark skin counts as talent, so should light skin. 
If, like Blake, you have different intuitions about the two cases, you 
face an interesting challenge, namely, to find a theory that will distinguish 
the cases in a principled way, explaining why the discriminatory 
shopping in favor of black doctors is permissible and that of the baseball 
fans is not. 
To meet this challenge, Blake first distinguishes between comprehensive 
and political liberalism.4  The former view extends its egalitarian principles 
over the whole realm of human life; the latter is a moral theory worked 
out for the specific domain of the political.  Blake is skeptical that any 
version of a comprehensive liberalism will work because the two 
doctrines of liberalism will apply everywhere and come into direct 
conflict.  Thus, Blake pursues a theory of political liberalism, a strategy 
that neatly sections off one of the two apparently conflicting doctrines 
by limiting it to a restricted domain; the egalitarian doctrine that says 
racial discrimination is wrong only applies in the political domain. 
Such a theory suggests that we need to answer the following question 
in judging the moral permissibility of discriminatory shopping: Is this 
act of discriminatory shopping likely to undermine the public equality of 
 2. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 293-303 (1985). 
 3. Blake, supra note 1, at 1022. 
 4. Id. at 1025. 
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our society?  To answer this question in turn requires that we check two 
ways in which public equality could be undermined: first, by people 
interpreting our actions as sending a message of social inferiority and 
internalized shame; and second, by exacerbating and amplifying preexisting 
relationships of injustice. 
The discriminatory shopping in the Jackie Robinson case is impermissible 
because the shopping does both of these things, whereas the discriminatory 
shopping of African-Americans does not do either.  The shopping preference 
of the latter is likened to a simple inclination to be served by redheaded 
men.  According to Blake, there is nothing wrong with catering to that 
inclination either, and it requires nothing in the way of justification; in 
neither case is anyone wronged because no history of irrational discrimination 
makes this impermissible.5
In sum, we can discriminate when it does not result in an internalized 
sense of inferiority or exacerbate a history of inequality.  Here is a neat 
way, then, of adjudicating between the two settled points of liberalism 
with which we began. 
Blake’s article poses a central question concerning the morality and 
political legitimacy of discrimination; he makes the abstract concrete by 
means of an intriguing puzzle, and he provides an ingenious solution.  In 
the remainder of this paper, I would like to raise two challenges for his 
solution; they are not necessarily consistent with each other, but my 
hope is that thinking about them will both further illuminate the key 
features of Blake’s view and provide a start in evaluating it. 
First, we might simply reject the intuition that the African-Americans’ 
preferences for African-American doctors should be catered to, 
particularly if they are mere desires to be served by those with dark skin 
color, with no further benefit in view.  Indeed, one might argue that even 
avoiding shops with non-redheads simply because they are non-redheads 
is problematic.  We might wonder what makes either of these kinds of 
cases different from, say, favoring beautiful people in secretarial jobs, or 
avoiding people who are overweight or disfigured.  Could people who 
are not beautiful be wronged, even if there are just a few being turned 
away? 
Blake seems to accept that the African-Americans’ preference could 
be wrong from some moral points of view, although not the one of 
political liberalism.  But the dialectic is not entirely clear at this point.  
 5. Id. at 1032. 




Political liberalism is supposed to help explain our moral intuitions,6 but 
there is a problem if we have additional (or simply different) intuitions 
that political liberalism cannot explain, a problem that is exacerbated if a 
modified comprehensive liberal doctrine can explain the whole set.7  
Second, one might share Blake’s intuitions (or at least some of them—
agreeing that sometimes discrimination is permissible, and sometimes 
not), but think that a different account better explains why we have them, 
or even better, why we should.  A brief comparison of Blake’s account to 
a different reading of Dworkin’s treatment of Bakke suggests that Blake’s 
account might produce some problematic results.  This comparison, while 
useful, is not meant to endorse this different reading of Dworkin as the 
correct theory. 
Blake seems to read Dworkin as seeing the African-Americans’ 
preference for African-American doctors as legitimate, regardless of their 
motivation.  But there is a more natural way to read Dworkin, according 
to which motivation matters.  On this alternative reading, African-American 
doctors would simply better serve the African-American community 
because as a matter of contingent fact they are willing to go into those 
communities, and because there might even be a significant statistical 
likelihood that they take more time with African-American patients once 
there.  These further facts about the situation, above and beyond the mere 
existence of preferences without a history of irrational discrimination,8 
are important in determining the legitimacy of the African-American 
preference for African American doctors.  On this view, the preferences 
are legitimate if they are simply responses to these facts, but they would 
not be if they were borne simply of contempt.  Consider Dworkin’s own 
words on this point: 
Affirmative action programs aim to provide more black doctors to serve black 
patients.  This is not because it is desirable that blacks treat blacks and whites 
treat whites, but because blacks, through no fault of their own, are now unlikely 
to be well served by whites, and because a failure to provide the doctors they 
trust will exacerbate rather than reduce the resentment that now leads them to 
trust only their own.9
 6. Id. at 1028 (“[Political liberalism is] an alternative approach able to more 
directly capture our intuitions . . . .”).  Further, Blake is clear that in his own view, “there 
can be some cases of private discrimination that are at the very least morally 
permissible,” and this is one reason Blake offers for preferring the political liberalism 
account to any comprehensive one.  Id. at 1027. 
 7. One response to this problem would be to recast the argument as offering 
political liberalism as a framework and seeing where and how far it can take us.  But that 
would be a different project. 
 8. Cf. Blake, supra note 1, at 1027-28 (describing a preference for red-headed 
workers as not representing a wrong to blonde applicants because there is “no history of 
irrational discrimination” against blonde people). 
 9. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 295. 
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Notably, Dworkin would regard their preferences as illegitimate under 
certain circumstances—in particular, if they were born of contempt, of 
the attitude that there is something inferior about whites, simply by 
virtue of their being white.10  Appealing to the idea of contempt, it is 
possible to tell a consistent story about why the African-Americans’ 
preference for black doctors is legitimate and so permissibly catered to, 
while the Jackie Robinson-haters’ preference is not and should not be 
catered to.  In the African-American case, by hypothesis, there is no 
contempt; in the Jackie Robinson case, there is.11  One could see this 
view as a liberal doctrine that does not deal with the tension within 
liberalism by restricting conflicting principles to different domains, but 
rather restricts by qualifying the principles so that they apply in different 
circumstances. 
In a sense, Blake’s account is all about consequences.  The question 
for his view is simple: does acting on or catering to the preferences have 
a particular effect of undermining a society of equals?  In contrast, this 
alternative reading of Dworkin considers the attitudes associated with 
the discrimination.  Dworkin cares very much about consequences, too, 
of course—but these come into play only after we ensure that no one is 
being wronged. 
 10. See Richard Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 775, 779 (2006), for a subtle development of the closely related idea that 
“discrimination that is intrinsically morally wrong occurs when an agent treats a person 
identified as being of a certain type differently than she otherwise would have done 
because of unwarranted animus or prejudice against persons of that type.” 
 11. Dworkin clearly holds that (i) preferences ought not be catered to if they are 
accompanied by contempt; and (ii) the African-Americans’ preferences ought to be 
catered to.  See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 301-02.  However, accepting these claims leaves 
open at least two possibilities: (1) as long as discriminatory preferences are unaccompanied 
by contempt, they can be legitimately catered to; and (2) only if discriminatory 
preferences are well-grounded in tracking nonarbitrary (although perhaps contingent) 
benefits are they legitimately catered to.  I thank David Brink for helping me see this 
point.  The view captured by (1) is the reading discussed in the text; interestingly, the 
view captured by (2) is, I think, closer in some ways to the first kind of objection raised 
in the text.  In essence, it reserves judgment about whether the African-Americans’ 
preferences are legitimate until more information is provided, and would only grant the 
permissibility of catering to African-American preferences to the extent that those 
preferences are based not primarily on preference for skin color, but for good service 
which happens to be contingently (but systematically) related to skin color.  One might 
even add that catering to such preferences must be the only realistic way to provide such 
benefits or that it must be done with the idea of eventually leading to less color 
consciousness rather than more.  This last idea is a hope to which Dworkin gives eloquent 
expression at various points in his article. 




One result of this aspect of Blake’s account is that it might have some 
counterintuitive results not present in others, including this reading of 
Dworkin.  To see why, it is important to distinguish between two senses 
of “sending a message.”  In one sense of “send a message,” a message is 
sent if the sender intends to convey information to another person, and 
no receipt of the information is necessary for successful sending.  In 
another sense of “send a message,” a message is sent if someone 
receives some information conveyed by the actions of another, and no 
intention on the part of the other to send that information is required.  
These can come apart.12  Returning to Blake’s example, what if no message 
of inferiority is sent to non-redheads, but that is the message understood 
by the brunette next door?  The problem here might be irrational or 
simply mistaken “uptake,” so to speak.  Blake’s account would have us treat 
these cases differently, while intuitively it is not clear that we should.  If 
discriminating against non-redheads is permissible in Blake’s original 
case, why not in the case in which, through no fault of the sender, it is 
misinterpreted?  If the account cannot accommodate this intuition, it 
cannot claim to provide a sufficient condition for impermissibility. 
The account also seems vulnerable when seen as offering a necessary 
condition for impermissibility—for reasons that do not only have to do 
with actions being wrong from some particular comprehensive point of 
view.  Imagine this time that you hate redheads, cannot stand them, and 
think they are inferior.  You discriminate, trying to send this message, 
but those non-redheads are just too thick to get your message, try as you 
might.  You might even be part of a movement with a mission to discriminate, 
but the message just fails to get through or to be internalized.  This is the 
“no uptake” problem.  If it would still be wrong to behave this way, then 
the wrongness of the discrimination does not require that the message 
actually get through. 
Blake’s view might be modified to account for these worries; the 
question would then be whether the modified version is superior to one 
in which at least part of the explanation of why certain types of 
discriminatory action are wrong is to be found in the attitudes with 
which they are committed.13  Both of the examples described earlier press 
on the idea that merely a particular kind of effect of the discriminating 
behavior bears on moral permissibility. 
 12. Teaching is a good way of experiencing this phenomenon. 
 13. Cf. Arneson, supra note 10, at 775.  In making an evaluative comparison, it is 
important to note, as Arneson points out at the start of his article, that it may be morally 
permissible to legally prohibit discriminatory conduct even if the conduct being prohibited 
would not be immoral in the absence of legal prohibition.  Thus, legal prohibitions of 
discriminatory behavior unaccompanied by attitudes of contempt could be permissible, 
even if contempt is a central morally wrong-making feature of wrongful discrimination. 
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Finally, a friendly suggestion.  On the framework Blake sets out, it 
might be appropriate to add an element to the account, namely, that 
discrimination could be impermissible if it begins a trend.  Suppose I am 
among the leading edge of discriminators, a real trendsetter.  Before 
long, all non-redheads (or non-Aryans, say) are losing customers and 
getting a bad message.  But no history of this exists until now.  It would 
seem that the existence of a history of irrational discrimination should be 
irrelevant in this framework.  What matters is the contribution to inequality 
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